Challenges of Implementing Deradicalisation Programs for Terrorist Prisoners: An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences

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Abstract
In dealing with convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons, prison-based deradicalisation programs have been instituted by Indonesian authorities. The programs consist of many activities such as religious classes (kelas pengajian), trainings, religious discussions, counselling, etc. For the implementation of such programs, terrorist inmates are the participants, while one arm of the implementers is the prison officers. The current study aims to investigate challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. Given the aim of the current study, a qualitative social research methodology is adopted. Focus group discussions with Indonesian prison officers are conducted in three Indonesian prisons, namely Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons. By employing thematic qualitative analysis, the findings demonstrate five challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers implementing such programs: (1) terrorist inmates’ personalities; (2) the readiness of Indonesian prison officers; (3) the sustainability of the programs; (4) institutional infrastructure problems; (5) and unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.

Keywords: Challenges, Deradicalisation, Indonesian Prison Officers, Prison-based Deradicalisation Programs, Terrorist Prisoners.

Introduction
The number of convicted terrorists is reportedly increasing worldwide where the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia report the greatest numbers with large...
increases in Western Europe (Eckard, 2014; Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna, 2010). As a result, many states have instituted deradicalisation programs to deal with convicted terrorists. States have developed their own approaches to persuading terrorist inmates to stop engaging in violent activities (QIASS, 2010; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013).

Most countries throughout the world have realised that a soft approach is an important part of solving and preventing terrorism (Gunaratna, 2011; Gunaratna & Ali, 2015; Neumann, 2010; Schmid, 2013). Implementing deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists is an example of an adopted soft approach in response to terrorism (Fink & El-Said, 2011; Schmid, 2013). According to Eckard (2014, p. 1), the objectives of the programs are preventing radicalisation in the prison and reducing violent behaviour of the convicted terrorists. Similar to global trends, Indonesian authorities have initiated deradicalisation programs inside prisons (Bakti, 2014), or prison-based deradicalisation programs, since the number of convicted terrorists is significant in Indonesia. Search for Common Ground (SFCG, 2013, p. 3) identified that Indonesian prisons were holding more than 800 terrorist prisoners between 2003 and 2013 under the management of Indonesia’s Directorate General of Corrections.

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs consist of many activities such as religious classes (kelas pengajian), trainings, religious discussions, counselling, etc. (Eckard, 2014). The participants of the programs are terrorist inmates. Although the programs are implemented by many agencies, either state or non-state actors, the main implementer of the programs is Indonesian prison officers (Nurezki, 2015, p. 74). Hence, Indonesian prison officers play a vital role in achieving deradicalisation objectives.

The present study aims to investigate what challenges faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. Indonesian prison officers’ experiences implementing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs is examined. Using a qualitative social research methodology, this study was carried out in three Indonesian prisons, namely Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons. Geographically, the three selected prisons are all located in the area of Java. Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison is one of the prisons on Nusakambangan Island, which is in Central Java Province. Cipinang Prison is in the capital city of Jakarta, and Surabaya prison is located in Surabaya in East Java Province.

**Literature Review and Research Gap**

The various research projects on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs could be divided into two major groups: (1) those of the program itself and (2) those of the terrorist prisoners. This division is based on the “angle” from which the program is viewed in the study. In the first group, aspects of prison-based deradicalisation programs itself are examined, such as the implementation of the program or analysis of the program components (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Neumann, 2010; Nurezki, 2013). In the second group, prison-based deradicalisation programs are examined from the perspectives of terrorist prisoners, such as their responses to the program or the extent of their involvement in the program (Andrie, 2011; Osman, 2014; Sukabdi, 2015; Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2013).
Yet, there is a lack of studies that examine the topic from the angle of Indonesian prison officers as the main implementers of the program. In other words, empirical qualitative studies on Indonesian prison officers' experiences related to the implementation of the program are lacking. Although several studies (ICG, 2007; Istriomah, 2012; SFCG, 2013) report interviews with Indonesian prison officers, the focus is not the prison officers’ experience of deradicalisation programs. Those of studies mainly concern how Indonesian prisons have managed terrorist prisoners. To produce further insight into this phenomenon, the current study focuses primarily on Indonesian prison officers’ experiences charged with implementing deradicalisation programs in the prisons. The investigation is narrowed to the examination of challenges that are faced by Indonesia prison officers in implementing such programs.

Methodology

Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers in implementing deradicalisation programs, qualitative social research methodology is employed. Referring to Brinkmann (2013), this methodology is considered because the focus of current study is not statistical representativeness, but instead to look in detail at how Indonesian prison officers experience the implementation of deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners.

Three of Indonesian prisons were selected as the research sites, namely Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons, due to the fact that they hold significant numbers of terrorist prisoners compared to the numbers held in the other prisons and detention centres. The largest number of convicted terrorist inmates was in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison, which held 37 individuals, followed by Cipinang Prison with 23 individuals (Suarda, 2016, p. 532). Surabaya Prison held 12 individuals which is lower than that of Batu Nusakambangan, Cibinong, Semarang, and Tangerang prisons. Yet, Surabaya Prison was selected since a previous study found that this prison is successfully managing terrorist prisoners and achieving the goals of a prison-based deradicalisation program (Andrie, 2011, p. 9). Examining the experiences of Surabaya’s prison officers is therefore valuable in order to gain insights into the implementation techniques used in this prison.

In line with the aim of the current study, participants in this research were Indonesian prison officers. They were selected using a purposive sampling method normally adopted for focus group research (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 50). To generate desired data, the criteria that the participants had to meet for the focus group were: (1) to have duties and responsibilities associated with prisoners’ rehabilitation and/or deradicalisation, including terrorist inmates; and (2) to have a minimum work experiences of 2 years. Further, the focus group were used as the method of data collection because conducting focus group is more efficient than conducting personal interviews, as concluded by Liamputtong (2011, p. 7) and Morgan (Morgan, 1997, pp. 13-14). Willing participants from this particular group were invited to join a focus group. As a result, three focus groups were conducted in Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons with the number of participants of 3, 5, and 5 respectively. The focus group started in Cipinang Prison on 1 November 2015, then in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison on 2 November 2015. The last session was conducted in Surabaya Prison on 25 June 2016.
Semi-structured focus groups were chosen as the data collection tool in order to explore participants’ experiences as much as possible. A set of primary questions, however, was prepared to guide the discussion. For instance, what do you know about the deradicalisation program? How do you implement the program in the prison? What activities have you undertaken to rehabilitate terrorist inmates? Do you treat terrorist prisoners the same as other ordinary inmates? These questions led to the several issues surrounding the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. The questions probed the experiences of prison officers while dealing with terrorist inmates in the prison facilities.

Because of conducting research with human subjects, procedures performed in this study were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee. An ethics application was submitted to the university ethics committee, and it was approved prior to conducting fieldwork. In addition to ethical concerns, I had to obtain participant consent due to the fact that this research was conducted with human subjects. Prior to the discussions, information and consent forms were provided to the participants to ensure they are aware of their rights and responsibilities as participants in the research. This is also important for the participants to gain an understanding of the purpose and usefulness of the research, as well as the way that the data would be gathered and used.

To simplify the representation data, two sets of characters were used to index the prisons: letters and numbers. Cipinang Prison was indexed as FG1, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison was indexed as FG2, and Surabaya Prison was indexed as FG3. Yet, for the confidentiality of the participants, only numbers were used. These provided specific short names for the information of focus group participants. To designate the research sites at which the focus groups were conducted, they were separated by a colon. They were marked in numerical order. For example, FG1:2 denotes information given by focus group participant number 2 in Cipinang Prison and FG3:4, denotes information given by focus group participant number 4 in Surabaya Prison.

In relation to data analysis, there are various ways of analysing focus group data as noted by Wilkinson (2011, p. 169). For the purposes of this study, a qualitative thematic analysis was adopted. In performing the thematic analysis, I undertook six processes in line with the step-by-step guide of Braun and Clarke (2006). Finally, the thematic analysis revealed five broad themes as challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs: (1) terrorist inmates’ personalities; (2) the readiness of Indonesian prison officers; (3) the sustainability of the programs; (4) institutional infrastructure problems; (5) and unavailability of collaborative mechanisms. Those of challenges found in the current study are discussed below.

Terrorist Inmates’ Personalities

The focus group results revealed that one of the greatest perceived challenges for Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs is the beliefs and behaviour of convicted terrorists. This challenge was experienced by focus group participants on a daily basis through contact with terrorist inmates, as well as while implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The focus group results also
revealed that the personalities of terrorist inmates are unique and differ from the personalities of other types of inmates.

**Terrorist Inmates’ Beliefs**

In terms of the beliefs of terrorist inmates, there are several challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers implementing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. Challenges recognised by the focus group participants were the beliefs of terrorists that they are not criminals; they are heroes in a divine war; and they were the only most “right” individuals in interpreting Islamist religious teachings.

First, imprisoned terrorists apparently have a strong belief that they are not criminals. All of the participants had experienced that most terrorist prisoners hold strong beliefs that they are not criminals. No participant rejected this assertion. A focus group participant said: “Although the acts of terrorist inmates took many lives, terrorist inmates feel very confident that they did not commit any criminal acts, so they believe that they were not prisoners” (FG2:4). Indonesian prison officers believe that the criminal label is not accepted by most terrorist inmates. Silke (2014, p. 4) has examined that criminal label will be debated by terrorists. Terrorist inmates have strong self-justifications for perpetrating violence and bombing attacks and do not see themselves as criminals. In the words of Yehoshua (2014, p. 146), “these prisoners entered prison with a sense of righteousness”. A number of authors have reported that terrorists differ from other criminals (Ganor, 2002; Goldman, 2014; Gunaratna, 2011; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Presman & Flockton, 2014; Silke, 2014; UNODC, 2016).

Second, convicted terrorists portrayed themselves as heroes. In the Indonesian context, convicted terrorists particularly imagined that they are heroes in a divine war for Islam. Because the background of the terrorist inmates was jihadist, they were all inspired by what others see as a misunderstanding of Islam teachings. A focus group participant said: “Most of convicted terrorists claimed themselves as prisoners of war from the battlefield of war between Islam and their enemies, including the established Indonesian Government” (FG1:3). Terrorists’ beliefs of themselves as heroes of a holy war seem to be consistent with Hassan’s (2007) study on Imam Samudra’s justification for the Bali Bombings. Imam Samudra was one of the masterminds of the Bali Bombings and was sentenced to death. In his article, Hassan (2007) demonstrated that Samudra’s idea of a perpetual war was the most critical aspect of his thinking.

Third, participants reported a further belief held by convicted terrorists that they were the righteous individuals in interpreting Islamic teachings. A focus group participant said that: “It would be difficult for us to implement deradicalisation programs, particularly on facilitating a religious discussion, because they were totally ready to challenge my interpretation about Islam” (FG3:5). It demonstrates that Indonesian prison officers experience a challenge in facilitating discussions on Islamic teachings with terrorist inmates when the inmates believe that they are the righteous individuals in interpreting Islamic teachings. This finding agrees with the findings of the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2007, p. 12) and Bakti (2014, p. 176), which showed a negative response of terrorist inmates to a discussion about Islam delivered by an outsider of their circle. Bakti (2014, p. 176) illustrated the impact of the initiative of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]) when Islamic scholars from
Jordan, Ali Al-Halaby, and from Egypt, Syaikh Najih Ibrahim, presented to terrorist inmates in the Nusakambangan prison complex. The inmates totally disagreed with the interpretation of Islam delivered by those scholars (Bakti, 2014).

**Terrorist Inmates’ Behaviour**

The behaviour of convicted terrorists was recognised as an obstacle by focus group participants to the successful implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. Focus group results revealed that reacting against the officers and refusing to participate in any programs were two challenges concerning the behaviour of terrorist inmates. These findings further support the issue of violence against prison officers as a direct challenge to the prison authorities (McEvoy, 2001; UNODC, 2016).

Reacting against the prison officers and refusing to participate in any programs were often experienced by focus group participants in day-to-day interactions with terrorist inmates. One indicator was an unwillingness to greet prison officers. Several terrorist inmates showed negative attitudes to prison officers by rejecting any greetings offered. To greet someone, an Indonesian Muslim normally says “Assalamualaikum” and the other will reply by saying “Waalaikumusalam”. Indonesian prison officers who greeted terrorist inmates in this manner found that terrorist inmates would not reply to the greeting; they ignored such greetings and tended to behave in an introverted manner towards the officers. A focus group participant realised that: “When I was moved here for a job promotion, I found that all convicted terrorists won’t speak with me. Even they look like they want to fight with me” (FG2:4).

These findings are consistent with a previous study carried out by Hannah et al (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). Hannah and colleagues (2008) classified the spectrum of the potential activities undertaken by radicalised prisoners, particularly using non-violent resistance and violent resistance to prison authorities. These two types of terrorist inmate behaviour have been experienced by Indonesian prison officers.

Non-violent resistance is indicated by inmates ignoring greetings expressed by prison officers. This passive action tends to block the opportunity to communicate with prison officers. Furthermore, when terrorist inmates were sick and needed medical treatment, “they do not want to go to the prison’s polyclinic” (FG2:1). In terms of prisoner rights to receive conditional release and remission, terrorist inmates also showed unwillingness to accept these rights. They refuse because the conditional release requirements include signing a declaration contrary to their beliefs, such as to “obey the Government of Indonesia and obedience to Pancasila” (FG2:3). Refusing any treatment options such as seeing the in-house doctor and refusing prisoner rights such as conditional release, could also be identified as non-violent resistance against prison authorities (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). However, during my fieldwork, no self-harm activities were reported, such as hunger strikes at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay as observed by Hannah et al. (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008).

Using violence to resist prison authorities was indicated by the potential harm faced by the focus group participants. A participant in a focus group indicated that he had “almost suffered violence” (FG3:4). It means that there is a great risk to Indonesian prison officers of violence from terrorist inmates. Although the focus group participants did not mention personal experiences of direct attacks by terrorist inmates, a prison officer in Cirebon
Prison was a victim of an attack committed by a terrorist inmate during an incidental operation to investigate illegal items such as drugs and weapons. The incident occurred in 2016 when the officer tried to enter the block where terrorist inmates were housed (Liputan6, 2016). That kind of attack against Indonesian prison officers was an example of using active or violent resistance to prison authorities (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008).

The Readiness of Indonesian Prison Officers

The theme of the readiness of Indonesian prison officers arose as a challenge in discussions of how confident the officers were to implement prison-based deradicalisation programs, and in discussions about the institutional problems experienced by the prison officers. Two related subthemes that emerged from focus group data should be noted as challenges for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs: internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are factors that relate to “inside” the Indonesian prison themselves, such as self-evaluation and prison officers’ personal aspects. Meanwhile, external factors are factors that relate to “outside” the Indonesian prison themselves, such as group-evaluation and prison officers’ collegial aspects.

Internal Factors (Individual Aspects)

Focus group data revealed two results that can be classified as internal factors of the readiness of prison officers: (1) lack of skills and abilities in terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation; and (2) lack of knowledge of religious Islamic teachings. Those of lacking becomes barriers to implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. First, while Indonesian prison officers may have substantial experience in dealing with prisoners, they lacked specific abilities and skills for dealing with terrorist inmates. The existing skills base is limited to dealing with general prisoners such as burglars, robbers, and murderers. A focus group participant stated that “prison officers have no specific training or knowledge in dealing with terrorist inmates” (FG3:5). Therefore, intervention and treatment applied to terrorist prisoners are similar to that applied to general prisoners. Second, although all the focus group participants were Muslim, they felt weaker or less informed than terrorist inmates about the Islamic teachings and the ideology of Islam. Indonesian prison officers believe that terrorist inmates have an advanced understanding of Islamic teachings and ideology. Hence, if a convicted terrorist provoked a debate on Islamic teachings or the ideology of Islam, focus group participants were unlikely to argue. Focus group participants believed they would lose a debate about Islamic teachings because “we were not good enough in the ideology of Islam” (FG2:2). Felling weaker among Indonesian prison officers than terrorist inmates in the field of Islamic teachings is because of the lack of knowledge of religious Islamic teachings.

These findings of the current study are consistent with those of Eckard (2014), who concluded the typical problem of Indonesian prison officers with limited skills and abilities, and those of Maliki (2013), who assessed that Indonesian prison officers’ religious education and experiences were often lower than those of terrorist inmates. These findings are also consistent with studies by Jones (2014) and Ungerer (2011), who concluded that prison officers and prison populations regard terrorist inmates highly because the inmates are devout religious men willing to lay down their lives for Islam. Osman (2014)
concluded that many prison officers avoid arguments with terrorist inmates because they might be angered or cowed when their “Muslim-ness” (p. 219) is questioned by terrorist inmates. In many cases, according to Osman (2014, p. 219), terrorist inmates are left to themselves by prison officers, who do not wish to be called thogut or syaitan (evil).

External Factors (Collegial Aspects)

Regarding the subtheme of external factors, the results found in this study were the limited number of prison officers, a lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. First, the limited number of prison officers affected the readiness of Indonesian prison officers to implement the deradicalisation program. The finding on the limited number of prison officers regarding the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs is consistent with those of studies by Abuza (2009, p. 198) and Eckard (2014, p. 170), who highlighted that “understaffing” is one of the key problems for Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation. A focus group participant argued that:

We were limited in number. You might say it’s a classic reason but that’s the fact we encountered. Here in this prison we have 1700+ inmates but the officers who supervise the inmates were only 12 officers. Can you imagine that? Twelve officers should supervise the movement of 1700+ inmates. Moreover, there are terrorist inmates who interact with these 1700+ inmates. How to overcome with this problem? (FG3, p. 5)

Second, another issue is the absence of professional support and training for Indonesian prison officers specifically on terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs. Although the focus group participants showed a strong commitment to rehabilitating terrorist prisoners, lack of professional support and training affects Indonesian prison officers’ readiness to implement programs. Focus group participant confirmed that: “The Directorate General of Corrections [DGC] itself has not yet provided training on deradicalisation programs” (FG1:3). This finding on the lack of professional support and training for Indonesian prison officers on deradicalisation is consistent with many other studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Maliki, 2013; Osman, 2014; SFCCG, 2013).

Third, turning to legal protection for Indonesian prison officers charged with terrorist rehabilitation, this was also found to be weak, or even unavailable. Focus group participants want support through appropriate legal protection in performing their job of rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. One participant said that: “Convicted terrorists will be accompanied by the Muslim Defender Team [Tim Pembela Muslim – TPM] if they have any legal problems during their incarceration. In contrast, we do not have it at all” (FG2:3). In relation to the previous studies, the lack of legal protection for Indonesian prison officers has not been described. Further, this finding does explain that the risk to Indonesian prison officers implementing deradicalisation programs was overlooked in the previous studies. Therefore, a research needs to be undertaken on the extent of the need for legal protection for Indonesian prison officers who have the specific task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates.
The Sustainability of the Programs

Another challenge for the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs is the sustainability of the programs. This finding is consistent with the analysis of the previous studies, which indicated that the nature of the programs was recognised as unsustainable (Bakti, 2014; Gunaratna, 2015; ICG, 2007). The focus group data showed that Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs are incidental and partial. Incidental means that the programs are designed and implemented incidentally as a companion of rehabilitation programs available for general prisoners. Partial means that the programs are not holistic regarding to some issues on participation, time limitation, funding, and family assistance.

An Incidental Program

Activities implemented for terrorist prisoners were mainly based on the Correctional Institution Law (CIL) as the umbrella legislation of the Indonesian correctional system. The more applicable legal material for the CIL is the Government Regulation Number 31 of 1999 on the Guidance of Prisoners, which also applies for general prisoners, that is, for all types of inmates. Because the existing Indonesian law and regulations on correctional services was designed for general prisoners and was not intended to be applied to specific types of prisoners, including terrorist inmates, Bakti (2014, p. 191) and Istiqomah (2012, p. 269) concluded that treatments and interventions applied to terrorist inmates were the same as those regulated in the CIL.

The incidental policies and practices for prison-based deradicalisation programs were obvious because the assistance of several other parties, either state or non-state actors, in the design and implementation of terrorist deradicalisation was only temporary. For instance, the Australian Government via the New South Wales (NSW) Correctional Services, trained Indonesian prison officers about Violent Extremists Risk Assessment (VERA) including officers from Cipinang and Pasir Putih prisons. Focus group participants acknowledged that: “We have joint cooperation with NSW Correctional Services, and they urged us to employ VERA for the assessment of terrorist inmates. I think DGC still try to find the appropriate model to be used specifically for terrorist inmates” (FG1:3). The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) assisted Indonesian prisons that hold terrorist prisoners, especially by providing religious Islamic scholars to lead discussions on Islamic teachings. This activity was also provided by the BNPT under the BNPT’s deradicalisation program, and by non-state actors. Some non-state actors, for example the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian – [YPP]) and the Search for Common Ground (SFCG), have provided assistance for the prison officers with the prisoners’ rehabilitation program, including terrorist rehabilitation. Those activities indicated the program was incidental, complementing established rehabilitation programs applied to general inmates. This finding is consistent with those of Eckard’s (2014) study, which showed that the Indonesian deradicalisation program was an ad hoc and fragmented program.

A Partial Program
Several interventions and activities fall under prison-based deradicalisation programs in Indonesia. However, they have not all been applied to all terrorist inmates – even among those in the same prison. This situation reinforces the partial nature of the program, which is, in part, due to rejection of program involvement by non-cooperative terrorist inmates, as explained by a focus group participant that: “Non-cooperative terrorist inmates … will reject any programs offered by the prison officers” (FG2:2). Based on Nurezki (2013) study, this refusal is because the prison authorities and the prison officers were perceived by the terrorist inmates as enemies since they are “the government’s tool” (FG2:5) inside the prison walls. The existing literature shows that the Indonesian Government is perceived as an enemy (thugut) by terrorist inmates (Bakti, 2014).

Apart from the rejection of programs, a timeline for the interventions also has prevented all of the terrorist inmates receiving prison-based deradicalisation programs. In Cipinang Prison, for example, initiatives of conflict management training (CMT) and life skills training (LST) proposed by the SFSCG have been implemented; however, not all of the terrorist inmates have had the same opportunity to participate because these initiatives were only offered for a limited time. SFSCG (2013) confirmed that the program was only a one-year project, from June to December 2013. Consequently, terrorist inmates sent to the prison more recently did not receive the same interventions.

Furthermore, although CMT and LST were judged appropriate activities by the Indonesian prison officers, the sustainability of the program was not guaranteed. A focus group participant explained that “because the programs were costly, we do not know if DGC can provide suitable funding” (FG1:3). In this case, the partial nature of the program is also associated with uncertain funding. This result match those observed in earlier studies, such as those by Abuza (2009) and Eckard (2014), which identify the problems of funding for the implementation of the prison-based deradicalisation program in Indonesia.

Next finding relates to family assistance in Indonesia’s prison based-deradicalisation programs. Focus group participants believe that family involvement in the program policy will foster the successful attainment of the goals of the terrorist rehabilitation and integration programs. Based on observation during the focus groups, there was a strong belief among focus group participants about the need for family assistance to be incorporated into the program, such as “school fees for their children or small capital for his wife to run a small business” (FG2:3). However, family assistance is not included in the existing programs – the programs are not holistic within the family of terrorist inmates. This result agrees with the findings of other studies (ICG, 2007; Pendleton, 2008; Ranstorp, 2009), which concluded that family assistance is an important part in terrorist deradicalisation in the Indonesian context.

In addition to this, it is interesting to compare the result of the current study with those of Sukabdi’s (2015) study, particularly on the behavior transformation process of convicted terrorists in the Indonesian context. Sukabdi’s study showed that family assistance was not a factor for the behavior-transformation process from pro-violence to non-violence. Therefore, the finding in the current study, that the absence of family assistance was an issue in the implementation of programs for terrorist inmates, differs from Sukabdi’s results. In this matter, a further study on the extent of family assistance can improve terrorist rehabilitation in the context of Indonesia is suggested.
Institutional Infrastructure Problems

Two infrastructure issues were identified as barriers to achieving the objectives of Indonesia prison-based deradicalisation programs. They are the overcapacity issue and the practices for housing terrorist convicts. These issues are evident, for example, in discussions of the large number of inmates in the prisons and whether there should be segregation or integration of terrorist inmates and ordinary inmates.

Overcapacity

The Indonesian prison system continues to face the problem of overcapacity. This problem has been always evident throughout most Indonesian prisons, especially prisons located in the big cities (General Elucidation of The Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M.HH-07.OT.01.03, year 2011). This common problem affects the tasks and responsibilities of prison officers during implementation of deradicalisation programs in the three Indonesian prisons studied. Participants from all the focus groups were mainly concerned that overcapacity helped the spread of radical beliefs in the prisons. A participant explained the negative impact of overcapacity on deradicalisation programs in which they “might fail to prevent the spread of radical beliefs” (FG3:3). The finding that overcapacity was a barrier in preventing the spread of radical beliefs matches those observed in Gunaratna’s (2011, p. 65) study that identified a correlation between the prison environment and the spread of radical beliefs in the prison. Overcapacity is a good environment for terrorist inmates in spreading their radical beliefs (Gunaratna, 2011). The finding is also consistent with those of a number of other previous studies (Eckard, 2014; Istiqomah, 2012; Jones, 2014; Osman, 2014), which outlined overcrowded prisons and the problems in practices for housing management of terrorist inmates, whether segregated from or integrated with other inmates.

Obscurity of Segregation Practices

The practices for housing terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons present a challenge for Indonesian prison officers. The DGC has no national policy on how terrorist inmates should be housed in Indonesian prisons (Jones, 2014, p. 87). Therefore, terrorist inmate housing depends on the policy of individual prison directors, policy as to whether they will be segregated from or integrated with other inmates, or perhaps isolated as emphasised by a focus group participant that: “Each prison director has their own consideration in this matter” (FG1:3). In the three prisons studied, it was found that in Cipinang and Surabaya prisons terrorist inmates were placed in a special block separated from the other types of inmates. In Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison they were housed in the same block with ordinary prisoners; however, previously they were placed in a special block. At the time of writing, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison no longer has a special block for terrorist inmates. These practices, according to focus group participants, become a challenge for implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.

There is a concern about the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are ideologues or hardliners from the rest of terrorist inmates, and within prison population. A focus group participant noted that “segregation policy must also be made
for terrorist inmates” (FG3:5). It is because: “the practices to mix non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will affect the implemented programs received by cooperative terrorist inmates” (FG2:4). Thus, participants believe that unclear housing practices on segregating non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will affect the outcome of the program received by the cooperative terrorist inmates. Through opportunities to communicate, non-cooperative convicted terrorists will always try to convince cooperative convicted terrorists to keep their established radical beliefs and view the imprisonment as a time for isolation. As one focus group participant said:

If non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates were housed in one block, they will absolutely gain better communication with each other. In this occasion, I believe they have a leader (Amir) who is an ‘ideologist’ or a non-cooperative terrorist convict. If this was happening, we can do nothing with the rest of the group especially to those who are cooperative with us. I do strongly believe that all terrorist inmates regardless their radical level will follow what the Amir (the leader) said. The program that we implemented will be useless indeed. (FG1:3)

Differences in policy and practices on the housing of terrorist inmates among prisons in Indonesia have been found in other studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Osman, 2014; Ungerer, 2011). According to Eckard (2014, p. 168), this issue was triggered by the absence of a formalised deradicalisation policy. The current finding of the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are ideologues or hard-liners from the rest of the prison population supports those of previous studies, which found that some non-terrorists were successfully radicalised by Imam Samudra in Kerobokan Prison; and even a prison officer, Beni Irawan, was also radicalised (ICG, 2007, pp. 8–9).

**Unavailability of Collaborative Mechanisms**

Focus group data revealed two prominent insights related to collaborative mechanisms in the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. The first is the lack of cooperation and coordination between the BNPT and the DGC, and the second is unorganised partnerships. From these insights, a broad theme of unavailability of collaborative mechanisms as a challenge faced by Indonesian prison officers in the practice emerges.

*Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between the BNPT and the DGC*

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs have been run by three major state agencies i.e. the INP, the BNPT and the DGC (Bakti, 2014). Although these state actors treat convicted terrorists and claim that they are working for terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation, their main objectives are different (ICG, 2007; Osman, 2014). The INP’s deradicalisation program, for example, is directed to further investigation or intelligence-gathering from arrested terrorists. The use of the accused terrorists for the purpose of intelligence-gathering showed positive results where several terrorist plots were dismantled (ICG, 2007). The BNPT, according to several studies, is more focused on terrorist disengagement than on deradicalisation (Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012). This is understandable because the scope of the BNPT’s program on deradicalisation is broader,
covering inside and outside prison facilities (Bakti, 2014). The focus of the DGC is the closest to terrorist rehabilitation, although it does not address terrorist deradicalisation (Istiqomah, 2012).

Of the many agencies that are involved in prison-based deradicalisation programs, the focus group results revealed that the lack of cooperation and coordination between the BNPT and the DGC was a significant problem. Although the BNPT coordinates the national deradicalisation program (Istiqomah, 2012), the majority of focus group participants were disappointed with the BNPT’s performance in this area. Focus group participants explained:

Identifying problems with the deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates, BNPT was too far from us. BNPT should be directly involved in the interventions, whatever the programs or activities; and then, together with us implementing it in the prison. So far it was not like that. We, prison officers, were likely to be working alone on terrorist rehabilitation. (FG2:4)

When BNPT came to the prison, they asked to meet with terrorist inmates. They sent a letter and provided the catering. We facilitated the room in the prison. They met with the inmates, provide a gift, took photos, and gone. Terrorist inmates went back to their cells. That’s it. We need more than that. Moreover, BNPT was a specific state body on counter terrorism so they should be able to do more. (FG1:3)

The quotes above indicate that prison officers had experienced lack of support from the BNPT’s staff in working together to achieve terrorist rehabilitation or deradicalisation. This result is consistent with those of other studies (IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012; Sarwono, 2012). Yet, a strong commitment to building an effective partnership between the DGC and the BNPT was developed, and was evidenced by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the agencies, signed by the former Minister of Law and Human Rights, Amir Syamsudin, and the former head of the BNPT, Ansyad Mbai, on 23 July 2014 (Ditjenpas RI, 2014). Following this, the former Director General of Correction, Wayan Dusak, and the Deputy of the BNPT, Abdul Rahman Kadir, also signed a MoU on the management of a deradicalisation centre in the special prison for terrorist inmates (Ditjenpas RI, 2016). In spite of the existing commitment among Indonesian authorities, further studies that assess whether the collaboration is good or bad are suggested.

**Unorganised Partnerships**

The key state agencies for Indonesia prison-based deradicalisation programs are the DGC, the BNPT and the INP, with support by others such as the MoRA. Besides state agencies, non-governmental bodies involved in prison-based deradicalisation activities include the SFCG, the YPP, and the Legal Aid Institute (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* – [LBH]). The involvement of many agencies in the effort to rehabilitate terrorist inmates, is beneficial because “it will help prison officers in rehabilitating terrorist inmates” (FG2:5). However, focus group participants also recognised that collaboration between agencies has not been managed well.
For example, support of other agencies in providing religious classes (*kelas pengajian*) for terrorist inmates does not accommodate the expectation of prison officers. A focus group participant stressed that: “The content of these classes were mostly general issues on Islam that encourage people to be a good person as a Muslim. This was not relevant for terrorist inmates since they have their own interpretation about Islam” (FG2:2). Another example of unorganised partnerships is the fact that valued programs, such as the CMT and LST programs, were discontinued. The programs facilitated and organised by the SFPG in cooperation with the DGC, the LBH and the YPP. Although focus group participants were satisfied with the programs, the sustainability of activities remains a problem of critical concern. If there was a well-organised collaboration, those of trainings could be continued. The finding of unorganised partnerships is consistent with those of a number of studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010; IRIN, 2012; Ungerer, 2011), which explain that, although there are many actors working on terrorist deradicalisation, the efforts have not been fully integrated.

**Conclusion and Contribution of Study**

Review of earlier studies on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs suggest that studies could be divided into two groups based on the “angle” from which the program is viewed. The first group of studies investigates the topic from the angle of the program itself while the second group of studies investigates the topic from the angle of terrorist inmates. The gap is studies that investigate the topic from the angle of Indonesian prison officers as the main implementers of the program. Hence, there is a need to investigate Indonesian prison officers’ experiences in the implementation of deradicalisation programs. The present study particularly aims to address the challenges of existing practices among Indonesian prison officers in implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. By deploying qualitative social research methodology, the present study concludes that five challenges were faced by Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs.

The first is the personalities of the terrorist inmates, which include the beliefs and behaviour of convicted terrorists. The beliefs of terrorists that they are not criminals, they are heroes in a divine war, and they are the only most right individuals in interpreting Islamist religious teachings were recognised by Indonesian prison officers as challenges of implementing deradicalisation programs inside the prisons. In terms of terrorist behaviour, the challenges were reacting against the officers and refusing to participate in any programs. Secondly, the readiness of the officers themselves, both individual and collegial weaknesses, was perceived as a barrier to implementing the programs. At individual level, Indonesian prison officers acknowledged their limited skills and abilities on deradicalisation as well as their limited capabilities in religious Islamic teachings and experiences. At collegial level, factors that identified as challenges were the limited number of prison officers, a lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. The third is program sustainability, in which incidental and partial nature of the implemented programs were perceived as shortcomings of deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates. As Indonesia has no national policy on prison-based deradicalisation programs, the programs were designed and applied incidentally. Further, such programs were
considered as partial programs due to the rejection from the participants, timeline limitations, funding, and its scope not including terrorist inmates’ families.

Fourth, institutional infrastructure problems contribute to the challenges in the implementation of Indonesia prison-based deradicalisation programs. Those of institutional infrastructure problems are the issues of overcapacity and obscurity of segregation practices in Indonesian prisons, which can cause the problem of the spread of radicalisation inside the prison. Lastly is the unavailability of collaborative mechanisms among the implementers of the program. Two prominent insights related to unavailability of collaborative mechanisms found in the present study are the lack of cooperation and coordination between the BNPT and the DGC, and unorganised partnerships among the program implementers.

Overall, this study contributes to extend the literature on prison-based deradicalisation programs. The focus of the existing literature on prison-based deradicalisation program is the program and the inmates in recent years, which shows that the programs and the participants were assessed but the end-users of the program were not. The current study advances the discussion of prison-based deradicalisation programs from the viewpoint of implementers' experiences that is Indonesian prison officers. More broadly, this study makes a contribution to related fields, such as terrorist rehabilitation, counterterrorism studies, and criminal justice policy by examining Indonesian prison officers’ experiences of implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists.

Limitations and Areas for Future Research

The recent study has limitations related to the number of research sites and focus group participants. Although conducting focus groups with the prison officers in the three selected prisons was sufficient to address the aim of study, it would be beneficial to select three more prisons as research sites because of their holding significant numbers of convicted terrorists. These facilities are Batu, Cibinong, and Semarang prisons. If these prisons are included, the number of focus group participants will also increase, in which further insights might be generated.

In terms of future research, investigation of the extent to which religious counselling can positively influence the deradicalisation of terrorist inmates is an interesting topic because of dissimilar results between the current and existing studies. In the current study, on the one hand, Indonesian prison officers considered that both incentives and religious counselling can be effective in terrorist rehabilitation. On the other hand, the earlier studies conclude that incentives are more effective than religious counselling. Additionally, this study has discussed the issue of radicalisation occurring in Indonesian prisons due to a policy of integration. Some focus group participants noted that segregation between non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates are mandatory to prevent radicalisation in the prisons. Thus, the effectiveness of integration and segregation policies for terrorist deradicalisation requires further investigation, particularly from the experiences of terrorist inmates.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to my PhD supervisory team, Prof. Reece Walters (my principal supervisor) and Assoc. Prof. Mark Lauch (my associate supervisor), who have
both supported and encouraged me to complete this study. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, the sponsor of my PhD. In addition, I would like to thank Indonesian prison officers who participated in this study. I wish to extend my thank to former Director General of Corrections of the Republic of Indonesia, Wayan Dusak, for giving formal permission to conduct fieldwork in three Indonesian prisons. This study was conducted with ethical clearance from the Ethics Committee of Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Australia with approval number 1500000642.

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